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Scam-Proof or Shackled? The New Law Placing Locks on Gullible Wallets
- Keegan Goh and Kevin Chew
- Apr 23
- 8 min read
In This Explainer, find out...
What obstacles have been encountered in the Government’s efforts to counter the prevalence of scams?
What does the Protection from Scams Bill entail?
What are the potential drawbacks arising from this Bill, and what safeguards exist to protect affected individuals?
Introduction
A complex, exploitative multi-billion dollar industry is taking root in the global economy. Within Southeast Asia, its insidious operations have been traced to forced labour compounds headquartered in regions of lawlessness in Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. In Singapore, victims lost a record high of S$1.1 billion in 2024 to this criminal enterprise. Who is the culprit behind all this? It is a vast, transnational criminal network that derives its profits from deceit and deception: it is the scam industry.
This Policy Explainer evaluates the steps that the Government has taken to curb the unprecedented rise in scam offences in Singapore. It focuses on the recently passed Protection from Scams Bill, its approach to modern scams and its potential drawbacks.
A Flood Of Scams
The Increasing Scale, Severity and Sophistication of Scam Operations
Scams in Singapore are becoming more common and severe. According to the Singapore Police Force (SPF), there was a 10.6 per cent annual increase in the total number of scam cases and a 70.6 per cent annual increase in the total amount lost to scams in 2024.
Most scams involve self-effected transfers, where victims willingly transfer money to criminals after being tricked into doing so. In 2024, self-effected transfers accounted for 82.4 per cent of reported scam cases in Singapore. Such transfers are often a result of social engineering consistently executed over a period of time. Social engineering is the manipulation of people into sharing sensitive information or taking actions that benefit scammers. These methods are very effective, leaving victims vulnerable to suffering large financial losses. The SPF reported that the five scam types which resulted in the greatest amount of monetary losses in 2024 were:
Investment scams: S$320.7 million;
Job scams: S$156.2 million;
Government officials impersonation scams: S$151.3 million;
Phishing scams: S$59.4 million; and
Internet love scams: S$27.6 million.
A common thread through these scam types is the sophisticated exploitation of human desires and emotions. For example, in investment scams, the scammer exploits the victim’s desire to earn money, misleading them with small and fake initial “profits” to encourage them to transfer more money. Meanwhile, in internet love scams, the scammer leverages the victim’s longing for affection: the scammer creates a fake profile to build a romantic relationship with the victim, offering affection over weeks or years before eventually requesting money under false pretenses. This long-term, psychologically exploitative scam method has been analogised to a “pig butchering scam”. Scammers “fatten up” their victims by building trust and eventually “butcher” them by stealing their assets.
To add to this disturbing landscape, some scam victims refuse to believe that they are being deceived, having been subjected to extended periods of complex social manipulation. In turn, despite advice from family members, friends and the authorities, these victims insist on transferring their funds to the scammers.
Existing Anti-Scam Measures
The prevalence of stubborn scam victims is worrying, as prior measures to tackle scams ultimately rely largely on user behaviour. For example, under the guidance of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the “Money Lock” feature was introduced in 2023. It allows users to “lock up” a portion of funds in their account that can only be withdrawn in person, with physical proof of identity. Similarly, the “Kill Switch” feature, rolled out in 2022, allows users to quickly freeze their bank accounts if they suspect fraud.
However, these measures are only effective if the users are alert to scams. As such, while they have helped many Singaporeans counter scams, they overlook the stubborn scam victims that refuse to heed advice from friends and family. Ironically, these individuals often suffer the worst losses, since they are more susceptible to long-term scams that siphon large amounts of money. As a result, policies that rely substantially on users to take responsibility for their own protection have proven inadequate, as scams in Singapore continue to grow in severity and prevalence.
The Protection From Scams Bill
In response to the above deficiencies, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) proposed the Protection from Scams Bill (“the Bill”) on 11 November 2024. Parliament passed the Bill on 7 January 2025.
This Bill covers both remote scams and traditional cheating cases. Remote scams refer to scams conducted via digital or telecommunication channels. Conversely, traditional cheating cases involve mostly physical interactions where the alleged cheater is known to the individual in real life.
Restriction Orders
The Bill empowers police officers and Commercial Affairs Officers (a type of civilian officer under the Singapore Police Force) to issue Restriction Orders (ROs). An RO directs a bank to disallow a transfer or withdrawal of money from any bank account of the scam victim, or the taking out of a loan in the name of the scam victim.
By default, an RO is issued to the seven Domestic Systemically Important Banks (DSIBs), which account for the vast majority of personal bank accounts in Singapore. If there is reason to suspect that the individual will use a non-DSIB account to transfer monies to a scammer, the RO may be issued to the non-DSIB too.
The RO may be set for up to 30 days or a shorter period and can be canceled anytime. It may also be extended up to five times, each for a period of up to 30 days.
The RO can only be issued if two stated conditions are met. First, the specified officer must have reason to believe that the scam victim will:
Instruct the bank to transfer money to a scammer, whether directly or indirectly;
Withdraw money from the bank with the intention of giving it to a scammer; or
Apply for or use credit to benefit a scammer.
Second, the specified officer must find that the RO is necessary to protect the scam victim.
By restricting scam victims’ access to their funds, the Bill seeks to protect them from financial loss and subsequent emotional distress. In particular, this Bill targets scams which rely on sophisticated social manipulation of victims, where victims often refuse to believe they are being deceived. Here, the hope is that issuing an RO will give such victims more time to reconsider their decision. Additionally, the victim’s inability to make monetary transfers for some extended period may even deter the scammer from pursuing the scam operation altogether.
Safeguards: ROs as a Last Resort and Appeals
Powers granted by the Bill are perhaps some of the most intrusive that have ever been introduced to address the growing tide of scams. The MHA recognises this need and has hence sought to find a middle ground between protecting victims and personal freedom. As such, the Bill has included various safeguards for individuals subjected to ROs.
Firstly, the RO is only used as a last resort. The police must first try to convince the victim that they are being scammed by engaging with them and their relatives. For traditional cheating cases, where the alleged cheater may be a real friend or family member, the bar for issuing ROs is even higher. The RO will only be issued if there is “clear and indisputable” evidence of a relevant offence.
Second, the Bill provides an appeal process. An appeal against an RO can be made to the Commissioner of Police by the affected scam victim, or any joint account holder of the restricted bank account. The appeal must specify the reasons for the appeal, provide necessary documentary proof and be made within the prescribed period after being notified of the RO. The Commissioner’s decision is final and will be based solely on documentary evidence, without the need for a hearing. Until a decision is made, the banks and the victim must continue to comply with the RO, unless otherwise directed by the Commissioner.
Potential Drawbacks
While public feedback on the Bill has been largely positive, there have been concerns about some potential drawbacks.
Infringement on Financial Autonomy
Firstly, some argue that the Bill grants overly intrusive powers, and may undermine personal autonomy. They believe it is too paternalistic because an RO prevents individuals from being in full control of their own bank accounts. Critics argue that the Government should not interfere in private transactions, even if it means allowing scams to happen.
The problem seems to be made worse when one considers that most individuals affected by ROs tend to be stubborn scam victims. A heavy-handed approach may thus make these victims reject measures that protect them against scams, viewing them as stifling and unjust. In response, the MHA has highlighted that ROs are a last resort, temporary in nature, and subject to appeal, as outlined earlier.
Furthermore, supporters of the Bill may assert that scams represent a broader societal threat that imposes a burden on scam victims, their families and the Government. Thus, the state has a responsibility to protect not just individuals, but also society at large, from the menace of scams. On this view, stronger intervention is justified.
Effects on Legitimate Transactions and Joint Bank Accounts
Second, the Bill may cause inconvenience for scam victims and third parties who share joint bank accounts with them. Scam victims would still require access to money for time-sensitive and legitimate financial transactions, such as medical expenses and General Interbank Recurring Order (GIRO) bill payments. Yet, under the Bill, individuals subjected to ROs must apply to the SPF for access to monies for living expenses, and substantiate the application with documentary proof. To that end, the proposed ROs in the Bill will cause inconvenience by affecting their ability to manage daily expenses.
Beyond affecting scam victims themselves, the Bill also poses challenges for those who share accounts with them. There are two broad types of joint bank accounts:
Joint-Alternate accounts where each account holder can perform banking transactions without the consent of the other account holders; and
Joint-All accounts where all account holders must provide approval before any bank transaction may be made.
Currently, ROs apply to both types of accounts. Hence, ROs may implicate joint account holders who face the same restrictions, even if they have not shown themselves to be repeat victims of scams.
In response, the MHA is working with banks to ensure that ROs can be imposed and lifted within hours. This will minimise delays for legitimate transactions. Furthermore, the MHA is currently considering exempting Joint-All accounts from ROs. This is because these accounts have added accountability requirements for transactions and are hence less likely to be drained by scams.
Increased Reliance on the Government
Thirdly, the Bill may lead to an overreliance on the authorities to stem the scourge of scams. ROs shift financial responsibility from victims to the police. This may encourage the sentiment that the Government is the primary agent responsible for saving scam victims. However, scam prevention requires collective effort from individuals, families, banks, and authorities.
As a result, there have been some calls to complement the Bill with public education on scams. Ultimately, the Bill is a temporary measure targeting scam victims who ignore repeated warnings from family and friends. Public education will always remain important. For example, the launch of ScamShield and the “Add, Check, Tell” framework is part of ongoing efforts to teach Singaporeans how to spot and respond to scams. These initiatives help Singaporeans recognise warning signs, practice verifying suspicious messages or calls, and take steps to protect themselves.
Thus, a dual-pronged approach is required for scams to be countered effectively. The Bill acts as a short-term solution to stop the loss of monies in a timely manner for stubborn scam victims. Meanwhile, public education serves as a long-term measure that gradually influences such scam victims to be more aware of the prevalence of scams.
Conclusion
In essence, the Bill represents a key shift in the approach adopted by the Government towards scams, moving from bolstering reactive measures to initiating proactive policies. With the passing of the Bill, Singapore now possesses a more comprehensive framework of short-term and long-term solutions to counter scams. To that end, the Bill does not shackle stubborn scam victims; instead, it sets them free.
This Policy Explainer was written by members of MAJU. MAJU is a ground-up, fully youth-led organisation dedicated to empowering Singaporean youths in policy discourse and co-creation.
By promoting constructive dialogue and serving as a bridge between youths and the Government, we hope to drive the keMAJUan (progress!) of Singapore.
The citations to our Policy Explainers can be found in the PDF appended to this webpage.
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