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From Island to Five: Singapore and the Five Power Defence Arrangements
- James Lim, Foo Yong Kun and Suhayl Saifudin
- Feb 25
- 8 min read
Updated: Feb 26
In this Explainer, find out...
Why were the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) established?
What do the FPDA entail?
How do the FPDA contribute to Singapore’s national and regional security?
Introduction
Did you know that the world’s second-oldest military pact counts Singapore among its signatories? Indeed, Singapore’s membership in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) began soon after our independence. The long-lasting pact involves global powers such as the United Kingdom and Australia, allowing them to contribute to Singapore’s defence in the event of major security threats to our nation.
In this Policy Explainer, we will delve deeper into what the FPDA entails and its importance in fostering a more robust and consultative approach to national and regional security.
Beginnings of the FPDA
In January 1968, Britain announced that it would withdraw all troops stationed in Malaysia and Singapore by early 1971. This pull-out, initially promised to be gradual, posed an existential threat to Singapore. British presence in the region was crucial to Singapore’s defence: as a small and newly sovereign city-state, Singapore had only begun to build its military capability. Hostile forces from Indonesia posed a high risk to national security following the end of the deadly Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation in 1966.
Furthermore, the withdrawal also threatened Singapore’s economy. At the time, British military bases in Singapore provided for over a fifth of Singapore’s gross national income (GNI) and employed about 25,000 local workers.
This retreat also meant that Britain would be effectively repealing the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA), which was subsequently renamed the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement in 1963. This agreement required Britain to defend Singapore and Malaysia should these nations be attacked.
Following pressure from U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Britain sought to reassure its allies, including those in Southeast Asia, that it would not abandon the region. Thus, in addition to committing to installing military infrastructure and technology, British officials and their counterparts from Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand convened in Kuala Lumpur in 1968 to begin negotiations for the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which would serve as the replacement for the AMDA. On 1 November 1971, the FPDA officially came into effect, replacing the AMDA.
What does the FPDA entail?
The FPDA is a mutual pact to provide external defence support to Malaysia and Singapore (at the time of signing), signed by Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. Uniquely for agreements of this nature, the list of signatories has remained unchanged since 1971.
Membership within the FPDA entails a commitment to consult with one another on an appropriate response, in the event of military aggression to either Singapore or Malaysia. While such incidents have thankfully not occurred, the agreement put forward reactive, instead of proactive, mutual defence efforts.
However, it should be noted that the FPDA does not oblige any member to provide military intervention or support. The agreement states that members’ governments will consult one another to decide on separate or joint actions against such events. This means that not all members necessarily have to take part in a military intervention if an attack occurs.
At the time of its signing, the FPDA had three founding principles:
As a defensive arrangement, it should avoid threatening the our countries in the region;
As a security agreement between multiple countries, it should operate at a pace comfortable to all parties; and
In light of the constantly shifting geopolitical environment, it should remain relevant by developing and evolving over time.
The FPDA’s founding principles reflect its members’ desire to act as a strictly defensive and peaceful security arrangement, being aware of the need to maintain harmonious relations in Southeast Asia. The principles also showcase the need for the FPDA to keep up with shifting security trends, by adapting to new changes over the past 50 years.
Evolution of the FPDA
Originally, the FPDA primarily focused on building up air defence capabilities. The FPDA’s Air Defence Council covered the formation of the Headquarters Integrated Air Defence System (HQIADS), to support the air defence of Singapore and Malaysia.
However, as Singapore and Malaysia’s militaries evolved throughout the 1990s, the FPDA’s main focus shifted away from air defence and began including land and maritime exercises. Members would host joint training exercises to simulate defending against potential threats.
The FPDA regularly hosts exercises simulating military threats over a five-year cycle, split into “Field Training Exercises” and “Command Post Exercises”. Field Training Exercises refer to live military simulations conducted in the field, enacting scenarios that may be faced in combat. Meanwhile, Command Post Exercises provide field training for command, staff and communication personnel.
Some examples of Field Training Exercises include:
BERSAMA SHIELD is a tactical exercise for FPDA air and maritime forces, held annually in Malaysia and Singapore. This routinely involves aircraft, ships as well as ground-based air defence forces.
BERSAMA LIMA is a tactical exercise including an operational-level headquarters to direct joint forces (aircraft, ships, submarines, land forces). It is held annually and led by the Malaysian Armed Forces or Singapore Armed Forces in alternate years.
Meanwhile, examples of Command Post Exercises include:
SUMAN WARRIOR is an annual exercise featuring land forces up to Brigade level. This is the only exercise to occur outside of Singapore and Malaysia, hosted by each of the five nations.
SUMAN PROTECTOR is a “capstone” exercise, occurring every five years. Hosted by Malaysia and Singapore, it features an FPDA Combined and Joint Task Force headquarters to plan and execute a large-scale defensive military operation.
Figure 2: FPDA members’ armed forces working together during a SUMAN WARRIOR exercise.
Since 2007, ASEAN member states (represented by government officials and defence figures) have been invited via the FPDA Observer Programme to attend and observe FPDA exercises. This provides reassurance to the observer countries, as part of the FPDA’s posturing as a non-aggressive pact not targeted against any one country.
In response to the changing global environment, the FPDA’s priorities have shifted over time as well. In 2017, it was collectively decided that the FPDA would enhance its capacity in non-conventional areas, such as counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance, and maritime security. This was in response to increasing humanitarian causes and rising extremism.
Currently, the FPDA’s scope and purpose are governed by the 3Rs, which were established in 2017:
To avoid deviating from its remit in contributing to the external defence of Singapore and Malaysia;
To develop and evolve to ensure relevance as a regional security arrangement; and
To maintain purpose and portrayal as a defensive arrangement to reassure other countries of the FPDA’s non-aggressive nature.
The FPDA and Singapore's Defence Policy
Similar to how other defence policies, such as the Enlistment Act, have strengthened Singapore’s national security, the establishment of the FPDA has also contributed to this cause via deterrence and diplomacy. That said, questions about the continued relevance of the FPDA have been raised. Such concerns prompt a deeper reflection of how the FPDA might continue to evolve.
Deterrence
The FPDA acts as an additional deterrent for would-be aggressors, strengthening Singapore’s national security. Apart from the presence of stronger military assets during joint operations, the FPDA also fosters the ability of different forces to operate in conjunction with each other (interoperability) and intelligence sharing between member states amidst an evolving security environment today. For example, the exchange of operational experiences and technological innovations is conducted via a range of dialogues, workshops, and technical seminars under the FPDA framework.
Overall, by being a part of this multilateral defence architecture, Singapore signals to potential adversaries that any aggression would have wider implications. That said, given the nature of the FPDA as a non-binding security accord rather than a formal alliance, members are not obliged to provide defensive support in the event of an armed attack against Singapore. Based on this, the FPDA mainly serves as a complement to Singapore’s national defence. Ultimately, the nation must still rely on itself for its peace and security.
Diplomacy
Historically, the establishment of the FPDA has enhanced regional diplomacy by finding common grounds for signatories to work closely together for their collective security. For instance, it helped repair relations between Singapore and Malaysia following tensions after Singapore’s separation from the federation in 1965. Today, the FPDA continues to play an important role in maintaining bilateral ties between both countries.
Recent cooperation among signatories of the FPDA on threats like terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief has also ensured regional stability. Successful diplomacy has yielded various benefits for Singapore’s defence. For example, the FPDA provides valuable opportunities for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to train in the larger grounds of Australia and New Zealand. These opportunities are crucial for the development of the SAF’s operational capabilities and readiness, given Singapore’s limited land for large-scale military training.
Relevance
Notably, as both Singapore and Malaysia have developed robust military forces compared to the early years of independence, skeptics have questioned the relevance of the FPDA in today’s context. With its origins dating back to the 1970s, some argue that the FPDA is now outdated. Indeed, back in 2017, Tim Huxley observed that, given the changes in the regional context, the original reasons for the FPDA “have become much less relevant or, indeed, redundant”.
In response to such scepticism, some may argue that the FPDA have evolved “in ways that transcend its origins”. Such supporters of the FPDA would point to the expansion of the scope of the arrangements over time. For example, the FPDA has provided the framework for cooperation on military and humanitarian issues. Furthermore, member states have also recognised the need to engage other countries and multilateral blocs, specifically ASEAN, to ensure that it continues to stay relevant and inclusive in the long run.
However, there remains emerging areas where other commentators have suggested for the FPDA to expand into. For example, David Andrews has suggested that the FPDA can do more in the realm of maritime security. This may be done, says Andrews, through a more direct involvement of non-military forces, given such forces’ significance in addressing maritime security challenges. At the same time, Andrews has also suggested the formalisation of expanded information-sharing between member states to enhance awareness.
A further emerging challenge that Euan Graham has raised is the possibility of continued ability for the different military forces to operate together. As Graham observes, there is a widening gap between the capabilities of different military forces in the FPDA. In turn, Graham has suggested looking to other multilateral defence groupings like NATO. This will allow the FPDA to adapt to the increase in capability differences amongst the defence forces.
Conclusion
Singapore’s identity as an economically formidable state with deep global ties makes us prone to targeted attacks from state and non-state actors. Indeed, even though Singapore does not currently face any imminent threats of military aggression, the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) has noted that hostile external groups have been conducting espionage attempts targeting “government and critical” infrastructure. Meanwhile, the Internal Security Department (ISD) continues to rate the terrorism threat to Singapore as high.
Given these vulnerabilities and Singapore’s small size, collaboration in defence, including through multilateral arrangements like the FPDA, is crucial to ensuring our nation’s security in the long run. As modern security threats are transnational, Singapore must take part in defence agreements that include our neighbours in the region. This collaboration would allow each nation to build mutual trust, confidence and operational experience in order to neuter interstate threats more effectively.
This Policy Explainer was written by members of MAJU. MAJU is a ground-up, fully youth-led organisation dedicated to empowering Singaporean youths in policy discourse and co-creation.
By promoting constructive dialogue and serving as a bridge between youths and the Government, we hope to drive the keMAJUan (progress!) of Singapore.
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