From Wear and Tear to Care and Repair: Singapore’s Home Improvement Programme

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In this Explainer, find out...

Why was the Home Improvement Programme (HIP) introduced?
How does the HIP work?
What benefits, trade-offs and limitations emerge from the HIP in practice?

Introduction

One vote.

That was all it took to decide whether one block of Tiong Bahru residents would see their Housing and Development Board (HDB) flats repaired and upgraded. One vote short, however, meant that the Home Improvement Programme (HIP) for the block of flats could not go through.

The HIP is a policy that solves maintenance problems in older flats, which can only proceed if a large majority (75 per cent) of residents agree to it. It aims to improve the safety and living conditions of residents, while giving them the freedom and autonomy to add optional upgrades to their homes, without requiring them to move out. For mature estates like Tiong Bahru, this policy would have brought an upgrade to the ageing infrastructure in the area.

The HIP, as the one vote shows, is not just another maintenance project. Rather, it is a decision that residents must collectively make. So how exactly does the HIP work, and why did one vote change the fate of an entire HDB block? This Policy Explainer looks to unpack these questions by first considering the development and operation of the HIP, and further discussing its impacts and limitations.

Why was the HIP Introduced?

Let us begin with the origins of the HIP. The HIP was not Singapore’s first attempt at upgrading homes. In 1990, the Singapore Government launched the Main Upgrading Programme (MUP) to revitalise older HDB estates and improve residents’ living conditions, without the need for residents to move out of their homes. The programme’s aim was to improve the standards of older HDB estates so that they could match the newer ones, in terms of both functionality and aesthetics. Under the MUP, lifts were upgraded, porches were built and surface-level carparks were replaced with multi-storey ones.

However, the MUP had a broad scope. While some upgrading works were carried out within the individual flats, the emphasis of this programme was still placed on precinct-level upgrades. Thus, some of the interior maintenance problems inside older HDB flats, such as spalling concrete and ceiling leaks, were neglected.

The HIP thus replaced the MUP in 2007 to fulfil this need. Its scope was narrowed from enhancing the neighbourhood to solving maintenance issues inside each flat. The works carried out under the HIP ensure that older flats remain safe and liveable for the foreseeable future.

As a result of this change, the duration of upgrading also decreased. Under the MUP, upgrading a whole precinct could take up to 2.5 years to complete. With the HIP’s more focused scope, this duration was cut down to 1.5 to two years. For each flat, upgrading works generally take up to 10 days to complete.

How does the HIP work?

Eligibility Requirements

During its initial launch, the HIP was only eligible for HDB flats built up until 1986. In 2018, the eligibility requirement was extended to cover flats built from 1987 to 1997 as well.

To determine if the HIP should proceed, the HDB conducts polls at eligible precincts, where each precinct consists of eight to 10 blocks. The HDB will conduct the HIP on a block if at least 75 per cent of Singaporean citizen households living in that block vote in favour of the programme. Permanent resident households cannot vote in HIP polls.

Types of Improvements

The HIP consists of three types of improvements: “Essential”, “Optional” and “Enhancement for Active Seniors” (EASE). If the HIP goes ahead, all flats in the block are required to undergo essential improvements, while residents can choose to add optional and EASE improvements. Singapore citizen households enjoy subsidised rates for these home improvements, though permanent resident households bear the full cost for all types of upgrades.

Essential Improvements

Essential improvements are deemed obligatory for public health and safety (see Figure 1 for examples). They are fully funded by the Government for Singapore citizen households.

Optional Improvements

Optional improvements are voluntary measures that households can opt for to enhance comfort and quality of life (see Figure 1 for examples). Citizen households pay subsidised rates between five and 12.5 per cent of the full cost of optional improvements, depending on their flat type (see Figure 2).

Improvement Type	Examples
Essential	Repairing spalling concrete or structural cracks
	Replacing waste or soil discharge stacks
	Replacing pipe sockets with new clothes drying rack
	Upgrading electrical load
Optional	Upgrading existing toilet by installing larger wall and floor tiles, and incorporating better-quality sanitary fittings
	New entrance door
	New grille gate
	New refuse chute hopper

Figure 1: Examples of essential and optional improvements

Figure 2: Cost table for Singaporean households buying the full optional improvements package

EASE Improvements

Households can also opt for EASE improvements to improve safety and comfort for senior residents (see Figure 3 for examples). Citizen households pay five to 12.5 per cent of the cost of EASE improvements.

EASE Improvement	Examples
Fall prevention and additional support	Grab bars
	Wall-mounted foldable shower seat
	Handrail at main entrance with steps
Wheelchair accessibility	Widening of toilet entrance
Wheelchair accessibility	Ramps at entrances with steps
Safety and well-being	Bidet spray
Safety and well-being	Home fire alarm device

Figure 3: Examples of EASE improvements

For blocks where the HIP has not yet taken place, residents can still apply for EASE improvements through the EASE (Direct Application Scheme). In line with the scheme’s focus on seniors, applicant households must have a family member that is:

at least 65 years old; or

at least 60 years old with required assistance for daily living activities.

The HIP II

The HIP II is the second phase of HDB flat upgrading, which is implemented for selected flats aged 60 to 70 years old. It will be launched within the next decade and will also focus on common maintenance issues in ageing flats. The Government hopes that the works completed under the HIP II will be sufficient to last flat owners to the end of the flat’s 99-year lease.

The HDB will explore new solutions and technologies in HIP II that are not adopted in HIP. For example, on spalling concrete, the HDB will adopt the corrosion-resistant repair (CRR) method to enhance the durability of repairs. The CRR method has been proven to be more effective than the conventional method of patch repairs. The use of microwave scanning can also help to detect spalling taking place under concrete surfaces and to narrow down the path of any water seepage. This allows workers to pinpoint the exact locations where more repair works need to be undertaken before the damage worsens.

More information about the HIP II will be released during the 2026 Committee of Supply.

What Benefits, Trade-offs and Limiations emerge from the HIP?

Social Objectives and Residential Benefits

For residents in selected HDB blocks, the HIP delivers substantial benefits at relatively low cost. HIP upgrades address structural issues and enhance features in ageing blocks, ensuring that homes remain habitable in the long run. Under EASE, elderly-friendly modifications enable seniors to reside safely and independently in their homes.

Viewed more broadly, this supports Singapore’s ageing-population strategy of encouraging seniors to “age in place”. Since its introduction in 2007, the HIP has had a tangible and far-reaching impact, upgrading close to 381,000 flats as of 2025.

Beyond preserving the liveability of HDB estates, the HIP may also promote more equitable social outcomes. Generous subsidies reduce or even eliminate upgrading costs, ensuring that lower-income households are not priced out of basic residential upgrades. In this way, the HIP advances the Government’s objectives in public housing provision, demographic planning and social welfare policy.

Collective Action vs. Individual Autonomy

At first glance, residential polls may seem like a productive way to implement the HIP. Voting enables residents to have a say in policies with immediate and material impacts on their lives. For some, this can encourage civic engagement and cultivate a sense of ownership over policy outcomes. Additionally, by basing policy adoption on resident consent, the HIP may gain a measure of legitimacy in residents’ eyes.

However, the HIP’s voting mechanism exposes an underlying tension between collective upgrading and individual autonomy. Despite the potential benefits of home improvements, residents can have legitimate reasons to vote against them. Upgrading works often entail lots of dust, considerable noise and prolonged disruption. For homeowners who have recently renovated their flats, the HIP may seem unnecessary. Landlords, meanwhile, may worry about disturbing their tenants or disrupting rental arrangements.

Where 75 per cent of households vote in favour of the HIP, residents in the minority are then forced to endure upgrading works they did not consent to. From this perspective, the HIP can be seen as unfairly intruding into private living spaces and restricting autonomy over one’s own home.

The HIP’s high approval threshold seeks to mediate this tension. On the one hand, requiring three-fourths approval helps ensure wider support for adopted HIP projects and offers some protection to minority interests. On the other hand, opponents may argue that this threshold allows a small minority to veto home upgrades that most residents prefer.

This latter concern is exacerbated in blocks with fewer households, where each vote carries outsized weight. In such cases, as commentators have noted, it may not be appropriate to use a voting system designed for blocks with many more units. For example, in the Tiong Bahru block that missed the HIP by one ballot, 11 of its mere 15 households voted “yes”. The remaining four did not vote. In small blocks like these, each household wields a veto power that may feel disproportionate. This case also reveals a further complication: participation in HIP polls is not mandated, yet absentee votes effectively count as “no” votes (since they do not contribute to the 75 per cent supermajority). This can lead to skewed outcomes, where non-participation — which may result from circumstances like being overseas — determines the fate of engaged residents.

Where a block fails to pass the HIP, some residents may then appeal for a re-poll in hopes of a different, favourable outcome. Already, this seems to be happening in the Tiong Bahru case. However, a re-poll may only raise more questions than it answers. On principle, having a second poll may undermine the integrity of the voting process and could be seen as undemocratic. In practice, re-polling appears to be carried out only if the HIP was rejected in the first vote — and not if it was initially approved. Not only may this pressure residents into voting for the HIP, it can also risk setting a precedent where HDB blocks repeatedly seek another vote until the HIP passes.

In short, while HIP polls carry some democratic value, they also expose unresolved tensions between collective action and individual autonomy. There remain real and persistent problems with the voting system, which may not be settled simply by adopting a single voting mechanism or calling for re-polls.

Fiscal Costs and Policy Implications

Another point of contention is the cost incurred on the Government budget by subsidies under the HIP. As at 2024, S$4 billion has been spent on the programme. This rivals the scale of government spending deployed in early 2020 to stabilise Singapore’s economy, amidst an unprecedented pandemic. For the fiscally prudent, the HIP may represent a significant budgetary commitment with real opportunity costs.

More importantly, HIP expenditure is not a one-off cost. As HDB blocks continue to age, spending on housing maintenance programmes will rise. HIP II, for instance, is estimated to cost more than the programme’s first phase since the older blocks will likely require more intensive upgrading works. Given that public funds allocated to the HIP could otherwise be directed towards competing priorities, the policy relies on continued fiscal capacity and political backing.

Zooming Out: HIP and VERS

Taking a more holistic view, experiences with HIP’s polling system will influence the design of the voting system for the Voluntary Early Redevelopment Scheme (VERS). VERS will allow residents of 70-year-old (or older) HDB blocks to vote on whether to sell their flats back to the Government for redevelopment, before the flats’ leases expire. Although the scheme will only commence in the early 2030s, there has already been much debate over how VERS’ voting mechanism should be designed. Some observers, however, have cautioned that applying HIP’s voting model to VERS may exacerbate present issues.

For residents, the stakes are much higher under VERS. Whereas the HIP involves in-flat upgrades and temporary disruptions, VERS entails the sale of one’s home to the Government before leases expire. From one perspective, a high consent threshold for the implementation of VERS may be justified, as it safeguards homeowners from being forced to sell their flat against their wishes. However, this potentially also allows small groups of unwilling sellers to block whole redevelopment schemes. In the latter scenario, VERS may wind up unevenly adopted across different parts of an estate. This may complicate the Government's urban planning efforts, which depend on the outcomes of VERS polls. With all this in mind, careful attention will need to be paid to the design of the VERS voting framework.

Conclusion

Sometimes, the fate of an entire HDB block comes down to a single vote. For the undecided resident, the benefits of home improvements may seem obvious but must be weighed against considerations of necessity and disruption. At the communal level, the HIP encourages a form of direct participatory governance, even as it exposes the inherent limits of collective action within diverse neighbourhoods. Such concerns ring especially true at a time when commentators are detecting a “fraying” social compact.

From the Government’s perspective, the HIP advances key national objectives, albeit at a considerable fiscal cost. Looking ahead, as Parliament moves to flesh out the VERS framework, policymakers may find that the HIP’s voting experience offers not just guidance — but caution.

This Policy Explainer was written by members of MAJU. MAJU is a ground-up, fully youth-led organisation dedicated to empowering Singaporean youths in policy discourse and co-creation.

By promoting constructive dialogue and serving as a bridge between youths and the Government, we hope to drive the keMAJUan (progress!) of Singapore.

The citations to our Policy Explainers can be found in the PDF appended to this webpage.